Political negotiation between Afghanistan & Pakistan

The role of political negotiation between two countries is significant in ensuring there is harmony and fairness which are considered essential within literal negotiation. Within the context of case study it will explore the political negotiation between Afghanistan and Pakistan and get an insight into the value of political negotiation and how both the mentioned countries have been able to maintain political negotiation.

Prior to examining the political negotiation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is important to have a fair background of what political negotiations are all about and why hold such significance.

In regards to the political context, it can be observed on a national and local level, the role of negotiation can be a very harsh career-changing matter. It should be pointed out how some kinds of negotiation takes a synergetic, collaborative and friendly approach; along with numerous exchanged which are established on political and personal gains. With regards to political negotiation it considerably makes majority use of social power. It can further be added negotiations are elemental to the texture of everyday political life and their effects furrow outwards into the future. Let us take into consideration a common outline and plot within the political field that takes place where an individual has some legislation which they want an approval for. In order to ensure this is approved, they will be initially required to gain a majority of their own party to support the proposed idea (Political Negotiation, n.d)

Pierce (2011) points out how it is imperative to comprehend the direction a negotiation is most likely to result in, this comes down to knowing each side’s initial position. Majority of the successful negotiations will result close to halfway between each side’s initial positions.

When examining the case study of political negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, one can observe they share a troubled and unstable relationship, this goes back to the 9/11 attacks in the U.S which drilled deep issues of Taliban, Al Qaeda and home-grown terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Back in the 1990s, the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad offered its strong support to the Quetta Shura Taliban since it was first founded. This support continued till the 9/11 took place. As per the findings, it pointed out that elements within the Pakistani security apparatus continued to consider the Taliban as a strategic asset for Pakistan’s regional policies. Once the 9/11 took place, this policy was altered by Pakistan; instead Pakistan chose to join hands with the US on its so called ‘War on Terror’. Practically speaking, the fact Pakistan exercised its switch in ally support to fighting against the war on terrorism, this kind of participation faced heavy backlash and was put on the spot by Afghanistan, allies and the U.S. It was during the Musharraf regime when Pakistan instructed its military and the ISI (secret intelligence authority in Pakistan) to work hard towards destabilizing Afghanistan and extend its support towards the insurgency. Whilst the relationship may have seemed to improve since Musharraf left the Pakistani government in 2008, however as per the last Pakistani President, i.e. Asif Ali Zardari, there were rogue traces within the ISI and the Pakistani military that may have actively supporting the Taliban on the Afghanistan and Pakistan side of the border (Pakistan and Afghanistan, n.d)

In an article titled “Negotiating with the Taliban: Reconciliation in Afghanistan and Pakistan?” it examines the potential for political negotiations to possibly resolve the weaponry dispute taking place on the Durand Line that segregates Afghanistan and Pakistan. It should be observed June 2009 has been marked as one of the bloodiest and violent month for a country such as Afghanistan post 2001 (9/11). This was followed by coalition forces launched in July with an enormous scaled counter-insurgency campaign in the buoyant Helmand Province. Unfortunately, the Pakistani government failed to come up with effective and implement purposeful and valid agreements with insurgent groups in the disenfranchised tribal areas. It was therefore important to establish an economic opportunity and give access to justice that would develop a promising foundation of insurgent support. There was a dire need to address these problems and find a potential solution, failing to which mean the military would fail to accomplish any peace (Negotiating with the Taliban: Reconciliation in Afghanistan and Pakistan?, 2009)

Ramin & Siddiqui (2013) refer to the troubled relationship Afghanistan and Pakistan share, their article titled “Blood Line: Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Unspoken Border Dispute” talks about how Afghanistan and Pakistan were in talks to sign up a strategic treat by the year ending 2013. This was considered as a golden opportunity for both the states to mend things between each other (in relation to the Durand Line). It can be observed both the countries acknowledged and complied to discuss a strategic partnership with the objective of developing a blueprint for long-term, binding cooperation on areas of mutual concern. One can emphasize here stability within Afghanistan and the region entirely was heavily dependent on getting the cooperation from Pakistan. Such heavy reliance would only plummet as NATO troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 2014. With the strategic agreement between both the countries, along with a structure targeted at resolving key differences and problems between the two would be considered as a major step in enhancing and improving the level of security and stability between the two countries; simultaneously bolstering existing treaties Afghanistan had with other global and regional partners. Looking back at the year 2001 when the horrific 9/11 attacks took place (fall of Taliban), this has left a deep mark and endless strain on the diplomatic relationship between both the countries. Whilst there have been numerous government to government talks that did result in minor concrete and tangible outcomes; however with such a strategic partnership, there is a ray of light that it would possibly turnout as a workable and feasible agreement. Back in November 2012, there was bilateral meetings organized in Pakistan which consisted of an agreement on the significance of close and persistent cooperation between the two states. In order to make sure the process did not end up staling as previous attempts of negotiations did, both the states were asked to address complicated issues, i.e. ranging from insurgency, safe havens, transit, trade, water-rights to security which have all been left unresolved. Without the active cooperation and participation of both the states and a clear and authentic analysis and discourse of the primary significant points of dispute underpinning all other issues, including the Durand Line.

Ghanzada (2013) explains how the freedom of Mullah Baradar by Pakistan was important to ensure there was peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan. With the Afghanistan’s insistence to the Pakistani government asking for the freedom of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, this was considered as a positive sign moving towards the Afghan peace process. The role of Mullah Baradar itself is considered central to expediting the Afghan peace process; his presence was undoubtedly essential since he is a key figure in Afghanistan. With such a step forward, his freedom was seen as a positive sign because Mullah Baradar wanted to put an end to the on-going violence in Afghanistan by using political negotiations as an alternative. It should be observed the liberation of Taliban prisoners has not only been seen as a revolutionary positive sign for improving peace talks but it has also raised numerous eye-brows concerned with a potential war in the fields combatting Afghan and coalition security forces that can be possibly problematic.

Peerzada (2013) highlights the likelihood of a military triumph over the Taliban in Afghanistan has been shunned and forgotten by all parties. However, the fact remains the efforts and attempts made by the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) i.e. mediation and negotiation have simply been crippled and eroded. Interestingly, there have been numerous efforts to resolve this matter via mediation by getting unbiased parties involved, i.e. German, Qatar and Turkey. Unfortunately, such efforts have simply been fruitless with no positive results. It should be pointed out the year 2014 is seen to be a significant for Afghanistan and the US troops since it will come down to the primary actors in the region who will be responsible for ensuring reconciliation and negotiations are agreed upon by Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even though there is an apparent readiness and eagerness by both the parties to find a solution via negotiations there are numerous obstacles, i.e. issues of distrust being one of them. It is the Americans who suspect the Taliban and panic Taliban’s connections with Al Qaeda; such issue is causing a major hindrance towards the potential progression of a political negotiation.

Shukri (2013) believes the release of Mullah Baradar was an important event that witnessed the Taliban supreme commander Mullah Mohammed Omar (top Taliban official) making it officially on the record that majority of Taliban members are willing to negotiate peace. Sheikh & Greenwood (2013) refer to an expert’s opinion in this research paper, as per Khalid Rahman (Director General, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan); he believes there is a great deal of ambiguity relating to what is going to happen after 2014 and the quantity of foreign troops remaining in Afghanistan. There are contradictory facts here, for instance as per some reports, they mention nearly 20-30,000 military troops will remain the bases in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the U.S government mentions the troops will be exiting Afghanistan simultaneously signing a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan that would make sure the presence of the US troops in the coming 10 years. Furthermore there is a problem, the ANA is not fit in a position to completely take over the security responsibilities and almost nobody is aware of who will be responsible for providing monetary aid to the ANA post 2014. It should be further added there have been numerous efforts made to invite the Taliban to play an active role in the Afghan politics, however as per the recent talks concluded futile as the US failed to fulfil its promises. However, this doesn’t stop the Americans from persisting and getting them to be involved and search for a viable solution. The participation of Iran and Pakistan are significant since the possibility of the negotiations failing are high if regional players are simply not included.

From the findings in this case study, it is apparently demonstrated how there have been numerous attempts and efforts made to resolve the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict related to the Taliban. The UN’s Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has played an excellent role. The fact the Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has been instrumental in inspiring enthusiasm to a post 2014 scenario where numerous significant issues (i.e. corruption, abuse of authority, cruelty, injustices, etc.) are being highlighted on a local level. The Mission is certainly deeply embedded in serving the civil society by accomplishing an Afghan-led political transition with an important role for civil society. Whilst a potential solution has been offered by the UN, it will act like a mediating bridge where issues of distrust and focusing on improving security situation will be of great significance. It can further be added, by mediating, the UN is offering the best currently available option for political negotiation settlement in a country such as Afghanistan. It can also be added in order for Afghanistan and Pakistan to accomplish a peaceful resolution via negotiated settlement, there needs to be a great deal of focus on human security; followed by national security that would make a concrete effort to secure the future of its citizens and people who are the direct sufferers of such a dispute. If such guarantees related to the vulnerable are missed out or neglected, any form of progression towards a political negotiation will simply be an illusion. Both the governments need to be put its people at the forefront and take into consideration how to go about securing their land and people simultaneously; followed by knocking out their own ulterior motives (governmental monetary interests) that would not benefit the overall civil society directly, instead they will be carrying the burden and carnage of poor decisions (war, conflict, etc.)

References

Blood Line: Afghanistan and Pakistan’s unspoken border dispute (2013) Retrieved 19^th December, 2013. From:< http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=157013>

Ghanizada (2013) Freedom of mullah baradar by Pakistan key for Afghan peace. Retrieved 20^th December, 2013. From:< http://www.khaama.com/freedom-of-mullah-baradar-by-pakistan-key-for-afghan-peace-2395>

Negotiating with the Taliban: reconciliation in Afghanistan and Pakistan? (2009) Retrieved 18^th December, 2013. From:<http://www.usip.org/events/negotiating-the-taliban-reconciliation-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan>

Pakistan and Afghanistan. Retrieved 22^nd December, 2013. From:<http://www.understandingwar.org/pakistan-and-afghanistan>

Peerzada, H (2013) A way out of the Afghanistan conundrum. Retrieved 20^th December, 2013. From:<http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/haifa-peerzada/way-out-of-afghanistan-conundrum>

Pierce, W (2011)Are Political Negotiations Dead? Retrieved 3^rd January, 2014. From:<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-pierce/are-political-negotiation_b_1110304.html>

Political negotiation. Retrieved 3^rd January, 2014. From:<http://changingminds.org/disciplines/negotiation/styles/political_negotiation.htm>

Shukri, F (2013) The Taliban and Peace Negotiations in Afghanistan. Retrieved 21^St December, 2013. From:< http://muftah.org/the-taliban-and-peace-negotiations-in-afghanistan/>

Taliban talks: past, present and prospects for the US, Afghanistan & Pakistan (2013) Retrieved 22^nd December, 2013. From:< http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RP2013-06-Taliban-Talks_web.pdf>

United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan & Pakistan. Retrieved 23^rd December, 2013. From:<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ungomap/background.html

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Political negotiation between Afghanistan & Pakistan

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